MEPI and Democracy Promotion: What Have We Learned?

Remarks by Peter F. Mulrean, Director, MEPI Regional Office
to the 7th Annual Conference of the
Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy
Washington, D.C. – May 6, 2006

It is a true honor to be among such a distinguished group of speakers and participants.  I am particularly pleased to be able to speak at this event, as I have known CSID and Radwan Masmoudi for four years now and have great respect for their work and the important and complex issues they address, as we have all seen in the discussions of these past two days.

It is also a good time to stop and take stock of U.S. democracy promotion in the Arab World through Middle East Partnership Initiative, or MEPI, after three years of its existence.

I have Good News and Old News about democracy promotion in Arab World.  First, the Old News – it’s not easy.  Not easy for those of us supporting democratic reform efforts, in part because this represents a new approach to the region and has required adjustments in how we carry on our relations there.

And it is especially not easy for people of the Arab World who are trying to bring about reform.  The operating environment is generally difficult, there is not a strong tradition of democracy or the institutions to support it, and there are a lot of unanswered questions about how countries and societies can best adapt to democracy.

Now for the Good News.  Things are changing and there are a lot of positive developments.  Across the region, increasing numbers of people recognize the need for some form of democracy to give them a voice in their future.  And increasing numbers of courageous individuals are taking action and demanding that their voices be heard.  At the same time, in the International Community there is growing consensus on the need to more visibly and vocally support democratic reform in the Arab World.

The United States decision to create MEPI was based on a reassessment in 2001-2002 of risk and opportunity in the Arab World.  We concluded that the status quo through much of the Arab World is unsustainable in the long term.  We all know the dire and sobering assessments of the Arab Human Development Reports of 2002 through 2004. The authors pointed to the lack of freedom, the lack of knowledge and the limitation of women’s rights as key factors holding the Arab world back from reaching its full potential.

And we understand that political systems that fail to support the aspirations of their people will become brittle and eventually collapse. Systems characterized by an absence of political choice, transparency, jobs, and personal freedoms are incubators for discontent and extremism. And in today’s globalized world, the actions of extremists anywhere impact all of us, directly or indirectly.

But in our assessment, we also recognized an opportunity, one that appears self-evident now, but that was ignored for a long time.  The people of the Arab World seek freedom and opportunity just like everyone else, and there is a growing community of reformers emerging.  To state the obvious again, building democracy, if it is to succeed, unquestionably must be homegrown and reflect the unique characteristics of the region.  But the outside world can and should support those seeking to change their systems through democratic means.

Based on this analysis, we concluded that U.S. policy towards the Arab World – which had essentially been based on preserving the status quo – had to change.  To recall President Bush’s words, “Sixty years of Western nations excusing and accommodating the lack of freedom in the Middle East did nothing to make us safe because, in the long run, stability cannot be purchased at the expense of liberty … It would be reckless to accept the status quo.”

So, the U.S. began pursuing a two-track approach.  The first track is diplomatic: urging governments in the region to undertake genuine steps toward democratic governance.  The second track is programmatic: supporting in practical ways individuals and groups striving to reform their countries and build a better future.  This second track led to the creation of MEPI.

Launched in December 2002, MEPI was placed in the State Department to enable us to underpin our overall foreign policy objective of supporting democracy in the Arab World with tangible support to democratic reformers in the region.  It is a concrete demonstration that our new approach to the Arab World is not just rhetoric, nor is it just about dealing with governments.  Rather, it is aimed at real people to produce real change on the ground. In other words, MEPI is not just another assistance program with long-term development objectives, but is a foreign policy tool, wholly integrated into our foreign policy approach, looking to respond quickly and flexibly to real-time opportunities.

As with any new approach, we needed to make internal adjustments.  On the diplomatic side, this meant adding reform issues to our bilateral agendas and keeping them high on those agendas when dealing with governments of the region.    On the program side, integrating MEPI into our approach required that we in the State Department develop new structures, skills and habits.  Policy experts had to learn about how assistance activities fit into the overall picture and vice versa.  Embassies needed to develop a broader set of contacts and partners among civil society, the business community and other potential reformers in the region.

Now, let’s be honest. The State Department may be full of bright, committed individuals, but it’s also a bureaucracy – and bureaucracies aren’t famous for adapting quickly to change.  Nonetheless, this time we have.  In three years, we have created a system that works.  We have:

· a fully staffed MEPI office in Washington, with the right mix of policy and programming experts;
· two Regional Offices, with American and local staff to oversee program implementation, and most importantly, to engage on the ground to seek out new contacts and opportunities, and ensure coordination between policy and programs;
· and a strategic framework through country-specific democracy strategies, coordinated across all government agencies, upon which we base both our diplomatic and programming tactics.

What I’m describing is the essence of what Secretary Rice refers to as “transformational diplomacy.”  Over the last three years, the State Department has retooled to engage in transformational diplomacy in the Arab World.  But addressing our own internal challenges merely prepared us to begin facing the formidable challenges to promoting democratic reform on the ground.

Over the past day and a half, people much more knowledgeable than I have spoken about the challenges to democratic reform in the Arab World, so I will just note a few of the most important challenges from the perspective of someone trying to support reformers. 

· Governments – While all governments have stated a commitment in principle to political reform, the reality is that the level of actual commitment runs from sincerity to hostility.
· Democracy Activists – With a few exceptions in the region, civil society organizations and moderate political parties tend to be weak, disorganized, and centered on strong individual personalities without well-developed constituencies.  Many governments also use administrative procedures, intimidation and other means to keep them weak.
· Information – Freedom of expression and access to information is crucial to democratic development.  In almost all countries, governments exert some control over the media and other forms of information.  Some governments exert virtually absolute control.
·  Extremism – It is not just governments taking advantage of the lack of a free flow of information.  Extremist groups use simple and sophisticated means to spread misinformation about the situation in their countries and to discredit or intimidate individuals and groups supporting democratic reform.
·  Our Image – We can’t deny the fact that the current image of the U.S. in the Arab World can also be an obstacle to seeking partnership with the groups and individuals in promoting democratic change.  I will return to this point shortly.

All of this brings me to the question I have been asked to address.  What has MEPI achieved in three years of promoting reform and what have we learned?  Since December 2002, MEPI has spent $293 million – and developed over 350 projects, the overwhelming majority of them for non-governmental actors and an increasing number of them as direct funding to indigenous organizations.  Let me give you a few examples:

· Last year, MEPI responded to calls from reformers in Lebanon and Egypt who wanted a voice in the future of their countries through democratic elections.  In both cases, we supported major domestic election observation and voter education efforts, which led to the people of those countries having access to real information about the administration of their elections – both good and bad.

· MEPI has just agreed to support the launch of a new network of prominent Arab NGOs, designed to increase the expertise required by democracy activists across the region.

· We are significantly increasing our support to independent media, providing training and expertise in both journalistic professionalism, and in modern management techniques that will strengthen media outlet independence.

· MEPI programs are supporting women in democracy, women and the law, women’s rights and women’s economic empowerment. One program created the Arab Women’s Legal Network, an association of more than 100 women lawyers and judges from 16 countries.

The network allows these women to exchange expertise and information, promote women as decision-makers, provide professional development training and mentoring, and help to secure women’s equal rights under the law.

Young people are showing their passion for change in the Arab World, and the U.S. is investing in their hopes for a brighter future. MEPI support has enabled the training of more than 3,000 teachers in civic education, reaching 65,000 students in 500 schools in nine countries. The result is programs such as Project Citizen, which helps young people influence public policy while developing support for democratic values.

One of the adjustments we have made to the MEPI approach over the last year and a half has been to reach out beyond our American NGO partners – who are doing invaluable work – and also directly engage with and support indigenous groups of reformers across the region.  We wanted to listen to their needs and priorities, and support their project activities.  Our regional offices have led the charge, working with our embassies to expand our network of contacts and to encourage them to accept our support for their important work.

When I made my first round of visits across the region after opening the Regional Office in August 2004, most reformers met me with skepticism.  And that was when they were willing to meet me at all.  They offered different reasons for their skepticism:  some didn’t think the U.S. was sincere about reform; some didn’t like certain U.S. policies; others were afraid that they would be tarnished, or endangered, by being closely associated with the U.S.

This was one of the key reasons why we created the MEPI regional offices – to have people on the ground to deal with the day-to-day reality of the challenges we face.  The only way I know of to address such skepticism is with engagement and perseverance.  So, we kept at it, engaging with those who were willing to engage with us, one by one.  Over time, the number of reformers willing to engage with us has grown tremendously.

I believe the main reason for that is that they have concluded that the U.S. is genuinely committed to promoting democracy.  As they have watched our clear, political statements at the highest levels combined with concrete support to reformers on the ground, their skepticism has faded.  It’s not that they now agree with everything we do, but they have identified that they and we have a common interest in promoting democratic change.  A clear sign of this evolution is the number of groups who avoided us in the past, but are now coming to us with ideas for reform projects for which they are seeking MEPI support.

So from my own experience, I believe that our consistent engagement is having an impact.  Don’t get me wrong, we have a long way to go in changing the views of the average man and woman in the street, but at least among the reformers we are interested in supporting, our message is getting through.  This is the beginning of what I hope will be a long, virtuous cycle.  The more reformers believe the U.S. is sincere in its commitment to democracy, the more they will be willing to accept our support, the more we will then be able to demonstrate demonstrate our commitment through concrete action.

A month ago, I was sitting in an old café in Cairo with a number of young democracy and human rights activists, individuals who are likely to be leaders of the “next generation.”  We spent hours talking about recent developments, immediate priorities, what role civil society, political parties and others would play.  It may not shock you to hear that our evening’s conversation did not find the solutions to all of the democracy problems in the region.  But I’ll tell you one thing.  It reaffirmed my belief that there are talented, committed Egyptians who are prepared to work and sacrifice to build a better future for their country. 

I’ve had similar experiences across the region that have also convinced me that the United States can help and is already making a difference.  We cannot make THE difference – that’s a job for my friends in the café. But we can help them by listening to what they need and what they believe will work in their countries.  We can help them in modest, practical ways through assistance.  And we can help them by keeping the pressure on the governments in the region to accept democratic change.

And we are helping them because it’s the right thing to do, but also because it’s essential.  If I return to the assessment of risk and opportunity where I began, both the United States and the people of the Arab World have every interest in standing together to promote the values and the practices that will empower the men and women of that region to thrive — and make their nations safer, more peaceful and more prosperous.  We will all benefit from that future. 

It is a true honor to be among such a distinguished group of speakers and participants.  I am particularly pleased to be able to speak at this event, as I have known CSID and Radwan Masmoudi for four years now and have great respect for their work and the important and complex issues they address, as we have all seen in the discussions of these past two days.

It is a true honor to be among such a distinguished group of speakers and participants.  I am particularly pleased to be able to speak at this event, as I have known CSID and Radwan Masmoudi for four years now and have great respect for their work and the important and complex issues they address, as we have all seen in the discussions of these past two days.

It is also a good time to stop and take stock of U.S. democracy promotion in the Arab World through Middle East Partnership Initiative, or MEPI, after three years of its existence.

I have Good News and Old News about democracy promotion in Arab World.  First, the Old News – it’s not easy.  Not easy for those of us supporting democratic reform efforts, in part because this represents a new approach to the region and has required adjustments in how we carry on our relations there.

And it is especially not easy for people of the Arab World who are trying to bring about reform.  The operating environment is generally difficult, there is not a strong tradition of democracy or the institutions to support it, and there are a lot of unanswered questions about how countries and societies can best adapt to democracy.

Now for the Good News.  Things are changing and there are a lot of positive developments.  Across the region, increasing numbers of people recognize the need for some form of democracy to give them a voice in their future.  And increasing numbers of courageous individuals are taking action and demanding that their voices be heard.  At the same time, in the International Community there is growing consensus on the need to more visibly and vocally support democratic reform in the Arab World.

The United States decision to create MEPI was based on a reassessment in 2001-2002 of risk and opportunity in the Arab World.  We concluded that the status quo through much of the Arab World is unsustainable in the long term.  We all know the dire and sobering assessments of the Arab Human Development Reports of 2002 through 2004. The authors pointed to the lack of freedom, the lack of knowledge and the limitation of women’s rights as key factors holding the Arab world back from reaching its full potential.

And we understand that political systems that fail to support the aspirations of their people will become brittle and eventually collapse. Systems characterized by an absence of political choice, transparency, jobs, and personal freedoms are incubators for discontent and extremism. And in today’s globalized world, the actions of extremists anywhere impact all of us, directly or indirectly.

But in our assessment, we also recognized an opportunity, one that appears self-evident now, but that was ignored for a long time.  The people of the Arab World seek freedom and opportunity just like everyone else, and there is a growing community of reformers emerging.  To state the obvious again, building democracy, if it is to succeed, unquestionably must be homegrown and reflect the unique characteristics of the region.  But the outside world can and should support those seeking to change their systems through democratic means.

Based on this analysis, we concluded that U.S. policy towards the Arab World – which had essentially been based on preserving the status quo – had to change.  To recall President Bush’s words, “Sixty years of Western nations excusing and accommodating the lack of freedom in the Middle East did nothing to make us safe because, in the long run, stability cannot be purchased at the expense of liberty … It would be reckless to accept the status quo.”

So, the U.S. began pursuing a two-track approach.  The first track is diplomatic: urging governments in the region to undertake genuine steps toward democratic governance.  The second track is programmatic: supporting in practical ways individuals and groups striving to reform their countries and build a better future.  This second track led to the creation of MEPI.

Launched in December 2002, MEPI was placed in the State Department to enable us to underpin our overall foreign policy objective of supporting democracy in the Arab World with tangible support to democratic reformers in the region.  It is a concrete demonstration that our new approach to the Arab World is not just rhetoric, nor is it just about dealing with governments.  Rather, it is aimed at real people to produce real change on the ground. In other words, MEPI is not just another assistance program with long-term development objectives, but is a foreign policy tool, wholly integrated into our foreign policy approach, looking to respond quickly and flexibly to real-time opportunities.

As with any new approach, we needed to make internal adjustments.  On the diplomatic side, this meant adding reform issues to our bilateral agendas and keeping them high on those agendas when dealing with governments of the region.    On the program side, integrating MEPI into our approach required that we in the State Department develop new structures, skills and habits.  Policy experts had to learn about how assistance activities fit into the overall picture and vice versa.  Embassies needed to develop a broader set of contacts and partners among civil society, the business community and other potential reformers in the region.

Now, let’s be honest. The State Department may be full of bright, committed individuals, but it’s also a bureaucracy – and bureaucracies aren’t famous for adapting quickly to change.  Nonetheless, this time we have.  In three years, we have created a system that works.  We have:
· a fully staffed MEPI office in Washington, with the right mix of policy and programming experts;
· two Regional Offices, with American and local staff to oversee program implementation, and most importantly, to engage on the ground to seek out new contacts and opportunities, and ensure coordination between policy and programs;
·  and a strategic framework through country-specific democracy strategies, coordinated across all government agencies, upon which we base both our diplomatic and programming tactics.

What I’m describing is the essence of what Secretary Rice refers to as “transformational diplomacy.”  Over the last three years, the State Department has retooled to engage in transformational diplomacy in the Arab World.  But addressing our own internal challenges merely prepared us to begin facing the formidable challenges to promoting democratic reform on the ground.

Over the past day and a half, people much more knowledgeable than I have spoken about the challenges to democratic reform in the Arab World, so I will just note a few of the most important challenges from the perspective of someone trying to support reformers. 
·  Governments – While all governments have stated a commitment in principle to political reform, the reality is that the level of actual commitment runs from sincerity to hostility.
·  Democracy Activists – With a few exceptions in the region, civil society organizations and moderate political parties tend to be weak, disorganized, and centered on strong individual personalities without well-developed constituencies.  Many governments also use administrative procedures, intimidation and other means to keep them weak.
· Information – Freedom of expression and access to information is crucial to democratic development.  In almost all countries, governments exert some control over the media and other forms of information.  Some governments exert virtually absolute control.
· Extremism – It is not just governments taking advantage of the lack of a free flow of information.  Extremist groups use simple and sophisticated means to spread misinformation about the situation in their countries and to discredit or intimidate individuals and groups supporting democratic reform.
·  Our Image – We can’t deny the fact that the current image of the U.S. in the Arab World can also be an obstacle to seeking partnership with the groups and individuals in promoting democratic change.  I will return to this point shortly.

All of this brings me to the question I have been asked to address.  What has MEPI achieved in three years of promoting reform and what have we learned?  Since December 2002, MEPI has spent $293 million – and developed over 350 projects, the overwhelming majority of them for non-governmental actors and an increasing number of them as direct funding to indigenous organizations.  Let me give you a few examples:

· Last year, MEPI responded to calls from reformers in Lebanon and Egypt who wanted a voice in the future of their countries through democratic elections.  In both cases, we supported major domestic election observation and voter education efforts, which led to the people of those countries having access to real information about the administration of their elections – both good and bad. 

· MEPI has just agreed to support the launch of a new network of prominent Arab NGOs, designed to increase the expertise required by democracy activists across the region. 
· We are significantly increasing our support to independent media, providing training and expertise in both journalistic professionalism, and in modern management techniques that will strengthen media outlet independence.

· MEPI programs are supporting women in democracy, women and the law, women’s rights and women’s economic empowerment. One program created the Arab Women’s Legal Network, an association of more than 100 women lawyers and judges from 16 countries. The network allows these women to exchange expertise and information, promote women as decision-makers, provide professional development training and mentoring, and help to secure women’s equal rights under the law.

· Young people are showing their passion for change in the Arab World, and the U.S. is investing in their hopes for a brighter future. MEPI support has enabled the training of more than 3,000 teachers in civic education, reaching 65,000 students in 500 schools in nine countries. The result is programs such as Project Citizen, which helps young people influence public policy while developing support for democratic values.

One of the adjustments we have made to the MEPI approach over the last year and a half has been to reach out beyond our American NGO partners – who are doing invaluable work – and also directly engage with and support indigenous groups of reformers across the region.  We wanted to listen to their needs and priorities, and support their project activities.  Our regional offices have led the charge, working with our embassies to expand our network of contacts and to encourage them to accept our support for their important work.

When I made my first round of visits across the region after opening the Regional Office in August 2004, most reformers met me with skepticism.  And that was when they were willing to meet me at all.  They offered different reasons for their skepticism:  some didn’t think the U.S. was sincere about reform; some didn’t like certain U.S. policies; others were afraid that they would be tarnished, or endangered, by being closely associated with the U.S.

This was one of the key reasons why we created the MEPI regional offices – to have people on the ground to deal with the day-to-day reality of the challenges we face.  The only way I know of to address such skepticism is with engagement and perseverance.  So, we kept at it, engaging with those who were willing to engage with us, one by one.  Over time, the number of reformers willing to engage with us has grown tremendously. 

I believe the main reason for that is that they have concluded that the U.S. is genuinely committed to promoting democracy.  As they have watched our clear, political statements at the highest levels combined with concrete support to reformers on the ground, their skepticism has faded.  It’s not that they now agree with everything we do, but they have identified that they and we have a common interest in promoting democratic change.  A clear sign of this evolution is the number of groups who avoided us in the past, but are now coming to us with ideas for reform projects for which they are seeking MEPI support.

So from my own experience, I believe that our consistent engagement is having an impact.  Don’t get me wrong, we have a long way to go in changing the views of the average man and woman in the street, but at least among the reformers we are interested in supporting, our message is getting through.  This is the beginning of what I hope will be a long, virtuous cycle.  The more reformers believe the U.S. is sincere in its commitment to democracy, the more they will be willing to accept our support, the more we will then be able to demonstrate demonstrate our commitment through concrete action.

A month ago, I was sitting in an old café in Cairo with a number of young democracy and human rights activists, individuals who are likely to be leaders of the “next generation.”  We spent hours talking about recent developments, immediate priorities, what role civil society, political parties and others would play.  It may not shock you to hear that our evening’s conversation did not find the solutions to all of the democracy problems in the region.  But I’ll tell you one thing.  It reaffirmed my belief that there are talented, committed Egyptians who are prepared to work and sacrifice to build a better future for their country. 

I’ve had similar experiences across the region that have also convinced me that the United States can help and is already making a difference.  We cannot make THE difference – that’s a job for my friends in the café. But we can help them by listening to what they need and what they believe will work in their countries.  We can help them in modest, practical ways through assistance.  And we can help them by keeping the pressure on the governments in the region to accept democratic change.

And we are helping them because it’s the right thing to do, but also because it’s essential.  If I return to the assessment of risk and opportunity where I began, both the United States and the people of the Arab World have every interest in standing together to promote the values and the practices that will empower the men and women of that region to thrive — and make their nations safer, more peaceful and more prosperous.  We will all benefit from that future.